On the Theory of Exhaustible Resources : Ricardo vs. Hotelling by D. Kurz, Heinz & Salvador, Neri
Discussion Paper No. 756 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON THE THEORY OF  
EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: 
RICARDO vs. HOTELLING 
 
 
Heinz D. Kurz 
Neri Salvadori 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2009 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
 
 1 
On the Theory of Exhaustible Resources: 
Ricardo vs. Hotelling*  
 
 
By 
Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Modern contributions to the economics of exhaustible natural resources, such as oil or coal, 
generally start from one form or another of the famous ‘Hotelling Rule’, first put forward by 
Harold Hotelling (1931). The Hotelling rule is an application of the concept of a competitive 
(uniform) rate profits to all processes in the economy, whether these are conservation or 
production processes. In the classical economists this rule is not yet to be found. Does this 
mean that their analyses are of necessity defective, incomplete or inferior? Or does it only 
mean that their argument relates to a world characterised by conditions that are different from 
those contemplated by the Hotelling Rule? Or is the rule implicit in their analyses and what is 
missing is only an explicit reference to royalties as something different from profits? 
The paper answers these questions. As regards the classical economists we will focus 
attention on David Ricardo, the most ‘classical’ of all classical authors, and deal with 
Adam Smith only in passing. Takashi Negishi in the introduction to a collection of 
                                                
*  Paper given at a seminar on 11 September 2009 at ISER (Institute of Social and 
Economic Research) of Osaka University by Heinz D. Kurz. The paper is a slightly 
revised version of Kurz and Salvadori (2009); all additions and changes are my 
responsibility. I should like to thank the participants at the seminar and especially 
Yoshiyaso Ono for most valuable discussions and useful comments.  
1  Neri Salvadori thanks Francesco Chioni for the discussions they had while Chioni 
worked on his Laurea Thesis under Salvadori’s supervision. 
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essays devoted to the history of economic thought stressed that ‘it is necessary to study 
theories that are regarded as past ones from the point of view of other research 
programmes.’ (Negishi, 1994, p. xi) Alternatively, one might study theories that are 
regarded as incorporating the most recent vintages of economic knowledge from the 
point of view of earlier approaches to the problem at hand. Comparing old and new can 
be expected to shed new light on both and improve our understanding on what is truly 
novel, what is only an old result in a new garb and on what has been lost sight of in the 
course of time. As Negishi put it succinctly in another contribution: ‘The history of our 
science should be used as a mirror in which the current theory reflects the knowledge of 
how it failed to succeed in the past. To learn from past theories does not impede the 
progress of our science. Progress often means, however, sacrificing something old. To 
make sure that we are going in the right direction, it is always necessary to see whether 
we have sacrificed something in error.’ (Negishi, 1992, p. 228) 
The Hotelling Rule, as it is typically presented, concerns the fact that the prices of 
resouces in situ need to increase over time at a rate that is equal to the competitive rate 
of profits. This fact seems in turn to imply another fact, namely, that all prices need to 
change over time. As mentioned in the above, the first fact follows from the requirement 
that the conservation of a resource is an economic activity which ought to yield to the 
proprietors of deposits of the resource the same rate of profits as it is obtained from any 
productive activity. The second fact is not immediately obvious. 
The contribution of this paper may thus be summarized in the following way. While it is 
commonly thought that Ricardo’s treatment of exhaustible resources is to be found first 
and foremost in the barely three pages of Chapter III of the Principles, ‘On the Rent of 
Mines’, this is actually not so. This chapter is in fact confined to a discussion of the rents 
of differently fertile mines in complete analogy to the rents of differently fertile lands. 
These rents arise because the exploitation of mines is typically subject to capacity 
constraints which imply that mines with different costs of extraction have to be  
operated at the same time. Ricardo develops an analysis of exhaustible resources rather 
in the context of a discussion of the difference between rent and profits. He begins this 
discussion in Chapter II, ‘On Rent’, in which he also criticizes Smith’s cavalier and 
confusing use of the two concepts. Then, in Chapter XXIV, ‘Doctrine of Adam Smith 
concerning the Rent of Land’, he elaborates on his criticism of Smith’s doctrine. He 
illustrates the fecundity of his own, Ricardo’s, rigorous conceptualizations of these two 
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important analytical categories in political economy and shows that Smith’s analysis is 
bound to end in a muddle. As usual, Ricardo is ‘desirous only to elucidate the 
principle’ at work (Works, vol. I, p. 121), as he stresses in another context, and therefore 
bases his argument on strong assumptions. These assumptions, which we will explicate 
below, imply that the exhaustion of each and every deposit of an exhaustible resource 
will nevertheless leave the prices of all produced commodities unaffected over time. In 
this way Ricardo manages to isolate a particular phenomenon at hand and put it into 
sharp relief. In the context we are interested in, this refers to the distinction between 
differential rent and profits, where what Ricardo calls profits comprises what we 
nowadays call royalties. Hence royalties are there in Ricardo’s analysis, but they are not 
easily identifiable as such.  
The composition of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we specify two fundamental 
assumptions required in order to be able to establish the fact that all prices need to 
change over time because of the Hotelling Rule. We then confront these assumptions 
with alternative ones which, it will be argued, are characteristic of the analyses of Smith 
and Ricardo. Section 3 provides some evidence in support of this proposition in terms of 
passages taken from Ricardo’s Principles. The main differences between the world in 
which all prices need to change over time because of the Hotelling Rule and the world 
about which Ricardo wrote are the following: (i) While Smith and Ricardo were aware 
of the exhaustibility of each and every deposit of a resource, they did not yet 
contemplate the case of the exhaustibility of the resource as a whole. (ii) Ricardo 
assumed that in order to meet the effectual demand for a resource, several deposits 
typically have to be worked simultaneously, because with regard to each deposit there is 
a capacity constraint that limits the time rate of raising the resource. Section 4 provides a 
mathematical formulation of the Ricardian point of view which allows one to compare 
the latter with the one underlying the Hotelling Rule.  It concludes that Ricardo may 
have well come up with the modern interpretation of the Hotelling Rule had he 
considered the case of the exhaustion of a resource in its entirety as a realistic 
possibility, which apparently he did not. Hence, a modern formulation of Ricardo’s view 
may complement the view expressed by the Hotelling Rule and thus render the overall 
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argument about exhaustible resources more complete. Section 5 contains some 
concluding remarks.2 
 
 
2. Different assumptions – different worlds 
The modern interpretation of the Hotelling Rule presupposes that the following two 
assumptions hold: 
(H1) The resource is available in homogeneous quality and in an overall quantity that 
is limited and that at any moment of time is known with certainty. 
(H2) The amount of the resource that can be extracted in a given period of time, a 
year, for example, is only constrained by the amount of it left over from the 
preceding period. 
(H stands, of course, for Hotelling.) In case one of these assumptions, or both, are not 
met, the Hotelling Rule has to be modified according to circumstances. It portrays a bold 
case of a resource whose exhaustion is actually foreseeable with certainty. The Rule 
                                                
2  Aiko Ikeo has drawn our attention to the interesting paper by Kemp and Long (1984), 
who in the context of a discussion of the conventional 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin trade model 
replaced the usual assumption of two non-depletable original factors of production 
(‘Ricardo’s indestructible powers of the soil’) and allowed instead for one or two 
exhaustible resources (‘Hotelling's destructible power of the soil’). They thus also 
combined ideas of Ricardo and Hotelling. However, their overall set-up differs 
markedly from the present one. In particular, they adopted a partial equilibrium 
framework by taking relative world market prices of final goods as given to the small 
open economy. In the case of exhaustible resources it is assumed that their exhaustion 
affects only production conditions in the economy under consideration, but not world 
market prices. They were also concerned only with homogeneous factors of production 
and thus not with extensive differential rent. The problem of whether Hotelling’s 
fundamental idea is somewhere hidden in Ricardo’s argument is not touched upon by 
them. 
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does not rigidly fit (m)any cases in the real world.3 Yet it expresses an important 
principle at work that contributes to our understanding of what is going on in the latter. 
It can be objected that despite the fact that today we have a much clearer idea of what is 
still there of certain resources at a given moment of time and are possessed of much 
improved techniques to discover hitherto unknown deposits of resources, assumption 
(H1) is typically not met with regard to any single exhaustible resource. It is also not 
clear whether knowing precisely what is still there would mean much, because technical 
progress typically affects the economic importance of a resource. The discovery of new 
ways to use known substances as well as the discovery of the useful properties of 
hitherto unused substances may lead to substitution processes and in the extreme replace 
some given resource entirely by new ones. Also assumption (H2) is never strictly met. 
Typically, there are capacity constraints that limit the time rate of exploiting a deposit. 
These constraints are very often binding with regard to any single deposit of the 
resource, so that many deposits have to be exploited simultaneously in order to meet 
effectual demand. 
We might go to the opposite extreme and postulate instead of assumptions (H1) and 
(H2) the following: 
(R1)  For each exhausted deposit of the resource another one with exactly the same 
characteristics is discovered and the cost of the search, in terms of labour and 
commodities, is always the same. 
(R2) The working of each deposit is subject to a capacity constraint that limits the 
amount of the resource that can be extracted in a given period of time. 
                                                
3  This is confirmed by Krautkraemer’s survey article (Krautkraemer, 1998). He 
maintains, among other things: ‘For the most part, the implications of this basic 
Hotelling model have not been consistent with empirical studies of nonrenewable 
resource prices and in situ values’ (p. 2066). ‘Other factors have overshadowed finite 
availability of the resource as determinants of the observed dynamic behavior of 
nonrenewable resource prices and in situ values’ (p. 2087). And: ‘It does seem to be a 
recurring tendency to overestimate the imminence of nonrenewable resource 
exhaustion’ (p. 2103; emphasis added). Vis-à-vis the evidence provided by 
Krautkraemer the classical approach to exhaustible resources could be said to fare 
better. 
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(R stands, of course, for Ricardo.) In case assumptions (R1) and (R2) replace assumptions 
(H1) and (H2) we are in a world that is much closer to that of the classical economists. Its 
properties are obviously different from those invoked in modern interpretations of the 
Hotelling Rule and therefore it should come as no surprise that Ricardo came up with a view 
which at first sight sits uncomfortably with modern interpretations of Hotelling’s analysis. 
However, the reason is not that one of the analyses is right and the other wrong, but that they 
cover vastly different cases. 
It goes without saying that there are intermediate cases beteen the two extreme ones: (H1) 
may be combined with (R2) or (H2) with (R1). Many additional cases could be studied which 
take into account, for example, that the discovery costs of new deposits are not constant or 
that the capacity constraint may depend on the amount of the resource that is still in situ. 
We shall refrain from elaborating a richer typology of cases followed by a comparative 
investigation of them all. We focus attention rather on the case that was most probably at the 
back of Ricardo’s mind. For this purpose we discuss, in the following section, what Ricardo 
wrote about exhaustible resources, the distinction between profits and rent and his criticism of 
Adam Smith’s views on the matter. 
 
3. Ricardo on exhaustible resources 
In the Principles Ricardo defines rent rigorously in the following way: 
Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for the 
use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil. (Works, vol. I, p. 67; 
emphasis added ) 
He continues: 
It is often, however, confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and, in popular 
language, the term is applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. 
If, of two adjoining farms of the same extent, and of the same natural fertility, one had 
all the conveniences of farming buildings, and, besides, were properly drained and 
manured, and advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other had 
none of these advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of 
one, than for the use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called 
rent. But it is evident, that a portion only of the money annually to be paid for the 
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improved farm, would be given for the original and indestructible powers of the soil; 
the other portion would be paid for the use of the capital which had been employed in 
ameliorating the quality of the land, and in erecting such buildings as were necessary 
to secure and preserve the produce. (Ibid.) 
 
Adam Smith, Ricardo goes on to argue, did not stick to a rigorously defined concept when 
using the word rent. In Part II of Chapter XI of Book I of The Wealth of Nations, ‘Of the 
Produce of Land which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent’, Smith gives 
an example of the timber business, timber clearly being a reproducible resource, in which he 
confounds the concepts of profits and rent (see WN I.xi.c.5): 
 
He [Smith] tells us, that the demand for timber, and its consequent high price, in the 
more southern countries of Europe, caused a rent to be paid for forests in Norway, 
which could before afford no rent. Is it not, however, evident, that the person who paid 
what he thus calls rent, paid it in consideration of the valuable commodity which was 
then standing on the land, and that he actually repaid himself with a profit, by the sale 
of the timber? If, indeed, after the timber was removed, any compensation were paid 
to the landlord for the use of the land, for the purpose of growing timber or any other 
produce, with a view to future demand, such compensation might justly be called rent, 
because it would be paid for the productive powers of the land; but in the case stated 
by Adam Smith, the compensation was paid for the liberty of removing and selling the 
timber, and not for the liberty of growing it (p. 68; emphasis added). 
 
Ricardo’s criticism extends to Smith’s dicussion of coal mines and stone quarries: 
 
He [Smith] speaks also of the rent of coal mines, and of stone quarries, to which the 
same observation applies—that the compensation given for the mine or quarry, is paid 
for the value of the coal or stone which can be removed from them, and has no 
connection with the original and indestructible powers of the land. (Ibid.) 
 
In Ricardo’s view the distinction between profits and rent is crucial, because as capital 
accumulates and the population grows the two component parts of the social surplus are 
typically affected differently: 
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This is a distinction of great importance, in an enquiry concerning rent and profits; for 
it is found, that the laws which regulate the progress of rent, are widely different from 
those which regulate the progress of profits, and seldom operate in the same direction. 
In all improved countries, that which is annually paid to the landlord, partaking of 
both characters, rent and profit, is sometimes kept stationary by the effects of opposing 
causes; at other times advances or recedes, as one or the other of these causes 
preponderates. In the future pages of this work, then, whenever I speak of the rent of 
land, I wish to be understood as speaking of that compensation, which is paid to the 
owner of land for the use of its original and indestructible powers. (Ibid., pp. 68-9; 
emphasis added) 
 
Hence what Smith called ‘rent’ of coal mines or stone quarries is to Ricardo profits and not 
rent. But does Ricardo not contradict himself by giving Chapter 3 of the Principles the title 
‘On the Rent of Mines’?  Scrutiny shows that this is not so. Chapter 3 is actually devoted to 
the rent of mines precisely in the sense Ricardo intended. The problem is the following: Why 
are mines possessed of different ‘fertilities’ operated simultaneously? Why is not the most 
‘fertile’ mine exploited in full first, followed by the second fertile mine, and so on? The 
answer is straightforward: Several mines have to be worked at the same time because each 
one is typically subject to a capacity constraint that limits the amount of the coal or ore that 
can be extracted per unit of time. This constraint itself is seen to depend typically also on the 
amount already extracted. Effectual demand cannot be satisfied in the given circumstances by 
operating exclusively the most ‘fertile’ mine, because the required rate of output in order to 
meet effectual demand cannot be generated in this way. The amount of the resource ‘which 
can be removed’ (ibid., p. 68) will generally fall short of the resource in situ at the beginning 
of the extraction period. The same argument applies in the case in which there are several 
equally fertile minds. Yet, ‘If there were abundance of equally fertile mines, which any one 
might appropriate, they could yield no rent; the value of their produce would depend on the 
quantity of labour necessary to extract the metal from the mine and bring it to market’ (ibid., 
p. 85). This is generally not the case and differently fertile mines will have to be wrought 
simultaneously. The situation may change due to innovations, as Ricardo emphasizes with 
regard to coal: ‘by new processes the quantity should be increased, the price would fall, and 
some mines would be abandoned’ (ibid., p. 331). 
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The absence of an abundance of equally fertile mines and the presence of a capacity 
constraint limiting the yearly output of any single mine in general necessitate the utilization of 
mines of different fertility in order to meet the effectual demand for the resource. In such 
circumstances, Ricardo stresses, it is the ‘relative fertility of mines [which] determines the 
portion of their produce, which shall be paid for the rent of mines’ (ibi., p. 330).  Ricardo 
concludes that ‘the whole principle of rent is here … as applicable to land as it is to mines’ 
(ibid., p. 330). When mines of different fertilities need to be wrought simultaneously, then 
this makes room for the emergence of (extensive) rents, exactly as in the case of the 
agricultural cultivation of land. This is rent in the true sense of the word and has nothing 
whatsoever to do with what nowadays we call ‘royalties’. What we call ‘royalties’, Ricardo 
actually calls ‘profits’. 
 
Ricardo’s use of the concept of profits for ‘the compensation ... paid for the liberty of 
removing and selling the timber’ is not surprising: timber can be sown and grown again, it is 
clearly not an exhaustible resource, but a reproducible good, and to the extent to which it is 
used as a produced means of production it is capital. But the use of the word profits for the 
compensation paid for the liberty of removing and selling coal or stones may be surprising: 
coal cannot be reproduced by men, neither can stones. However, new coal pits can always be 
expected to be discovered and the cost of the search is equal to the value of the mine, a value 
that decreases with the amount of the resource that has been removed. In other words, Ricardo 
did not need the word royalties since the minerals and ores etc. as such were not considered to 
be fully exhaustible in the foreseeable future. Both in Ricardo and in Smith we encounter time 
and again references to the finding of new deposits with no serious consideration given to the 
fact that such deposits, taken as a whole, are limited. This is the reason why Ricardo did not 
need a new concept in order to be able to deal with the case under consideration. The concept 
of profits was all that was required. 
 
The fact that Ricardo did not elaborate what now is called the Hotelling Rule cannot therefore 
be considered an expression of a failure and a lack of analytical profundity on his part. It 
simply expresses a concern with a world in which the total exhaustion of certain resources 
was not yet considered a possibility worth studying. 
 
What we now call royalties are a sub-category of profits. Profits are proportional to the value 
of capital invested or possessed, and in conditions of free competition the rate of profits 
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obtained in oder to conserve the mineral in the ground has to be equal to the rate of profits 
obtained from any other production or conservation process.  
 
If assumption (R1) held true, while each deposit would be exhaustible, the resource as such 
would not; and each deposit could in fact be treated as if it were a (reproducible) machine: the 
price of the new machine equals the cost of the search and the price of an old machine of age t 
equals the value of the deposit after t periods of utilization  (see Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, pp. 
359-60). The price of the resource in situ would change as predicted by the Hotelling Rule, 
but the price of the extracted mineral would be constant over time.4 In the next section we 
assume that (H1) and (R2) apply. We will show that also in this case the changes of the prices 
of the resources in situ may not need the introduction of intertemporal equilibria. But the 
model elaborated is more general and is of some interest in itself. It consists essentially of a 
modified version of a model we put forward in Kurz and Salvadori (2000). The novelty in the 
new formalization compared with the original one is to be seen first and foremost in the 
introduction of capacity constraints with respect to the exploitation of each single deposit of a 
resource. 
 
 
3. A formalization 
 
The formalization suggested here is based on the following simplifying assumptions. A finite 
number n of different commodities, which are fully divisible, are produced in the economy 
and a finite number m (> n) of constant returns to scale processes are known to produce them. 
Let pt be the vector of prices of commodities available at time  t ! ! 0  and let xt be the vector 
of the intensities of operation of processes at time  t ! ! . A process or method of production 
is defined by a quadruplet (a, b, c, l), where  a ! !n  is the commodity input vector,  b ! !n  is 
the output vector,  c ! !s  is the exhaustible resources input vector, and l is the labour input, a 
scalar; of course a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, c ≥,_   0, l ≥ 0. The production period is uniform across all 
                                                
4 Adam Smith wrote about the discovery of new mines: ‘In this search [for new mines] 
there seem to be no certain limits either to the possible success, or to the possible 
disappointment of human industry. In the course of a century or two, it is possible that 
new mines may be discovered more fertile than any that have ever yet been known; and 
it is just equally possible that the most fertile mine then known may be more barren than 
any that was wrought before the discovery of the mines of America’ (WN I.xi.m.21). 
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processes. It is important to remark that the inputs referred to in vector c are inputs of the 
resources as they are provided by nature; for example, extracted oil is not contained in c, but 
in b, if (a, b, c, l) is an extraction process, or in a, if (a, b, c, l) is a process that uses it, unless 
the extraction costs are nil. The m existing processes are defined by quadruplets 
 (aj, bj, cj, lj). j = 1, 2, ... , m 
Then define matrices A, B, C and (now) vector l as follows:5 
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Assume that the annual consumption of commodities by profit (and royalty) recipients is  
proportional to a vector d, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be given and constant over 
time, that is, independent of prices and quantities, including the quantities of the exhaustible 
resources left over at the end of each production period. In addition, the real wage rate, 
defined by a commodity vector w, is taken to be given and constant over time. y is the vector 
of royalties earned with respect to the various natural resources; q is the vector of rents 
obtained in exploiting different deposits of them; z is the vector of the amounts of resources 
available. Technical innovations of any kind are set aside. All exhaustible resources are 
private property. In conditions of free competition there will be a (tendency towards a) 
uniform nominal rate of profits rt across all production activities in the economy. This implies 
that, for each time 
 
t ! !
0
 , the following inequalities and equations are to be satisfied: 
 
Bp
t+1  ! 1+ rt( ) Apt +Cyt +Cqt( ) + lw
Tp
t+1       (1) 
x
t+1
T Bp
t+1 = xt+1
T
(1+ r
t
) Ap
t
+Cy
t
+Cq
t( ) +  lw
Tp
t+1
!" #$      (2) 
y
t+1  ! 1+ rt( )yt           (3) 
z
t+1
T
y
t+1  = 1+ rt( )zt+1
T
y
t          (4) 
x
t+1
T
B ! lw
T( )  " xt+2
T
A + #dT         (5) 
                                                
5 Transposition of a vector or a matrix is denoted by superscript T. 
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x
t+1
T B ! lwT( )pt+1 = xt+2T A + " dT( )pt+1        (6) 
z
t
T
 ! x
t+1
T
C+ z
t+1
T
          (7) 
z
t
Ty
t
= x
t+1
T C + z
t+1
T( )yt          (8) 
z
t
T
 ! z
t+1
T
+ t
T
          (9) 
z
t
T
q
t
= z
t+1
T
+ t
T( )qt          (10) 
! > 0,p
t
 " 0, y
t
 " 0, q " 0, z
t
 " 0, x
t+1
 " 0 .      (11) 
 
Inequality (1) means that nobody can get extra profits by producing commodities available at 
time t + 1. Equation (2) implies, because of inequalities (1) and (11), that commodities 
available at time t + 1 will only be produced if the ruling nominal rate of interest is obtained. 
Inequality (3) means that nobody can get extra profits by storing exhaustible resources from 
time t to time t + 1. Equation (4) implies, because of inequalities (3) and (11), that exhaustible 
resources will be stored from time t to time t + 1 only if the ruling nominal rate of interest will 
be obtained by this storage activity. Inequality (5) implies that the amounts of commodities 
produced are not smaller than the amounts of commodities required, and equation (6) implies 
that if an amount is larger, then the price of that commodity is zero. Inequality (7) implies that 
the amounts of exhaustible resources available at time t are not smaller than the amounts of 
exhaustible resources available at time t + 1 plus the amounts of exhaustible resources utilized 
to produce commodities available at time t + 1, and equation (8) implies that if an amount is 
larger, then the price of that exhaustible resource is zero. Inequality (9) implies that at each 
time t extraction of resource j cannot be larger than tTe j , and equation (10) implies that if it is 
smaller, then the rent obtained by the owner of the deposit of resource j is zero. The meaning 
of inequalities (11) is obvious. 
 
The difference with a world in which there are no capacity constraints in the extraction of 
resources is close at hand: the elements of vector t  are so high that inequality (9) is always 
satisfied as a strict inequality, then equation (10) implies that q
t
= 0 : in this case the model 
collapses to that analyzed in Kurz and Salvadori (2000). 
 
The following observations are perhaps apposite. First, as the system gradually uses up its 
given stocks of exhaustible resources, moving from deposits that are less costly to operate to 
more costly ones, the overall (i.e. direct and indirect) amount needed of any such resource to 
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produce one unit of the various commodities and indeed also to extract one additional unit of 
the resource itself may, and generally will, go up. Therefore, with a given net output vector 
the total amounts of the exhaustible resources extracted per period will increase over time: As 
the remaining stocks of the resources get smaller, the quantities used up get larger, at least for 
some time. Second, due to the decrease in the economic system’s overall productivity, 
reflecting diminishing returns in the extraction industries, the rate of profits can be expected 
to fall over time. This mimicks Ricardo’s result in his theory of ground rent. Third, there is no 
reason to presume that all resources will be fully exhausted. Since costs of extraction can be 
expected to rise, a point may come where it is no longer advisable to exploit deposits. (That 
this may very well be the case can be seen with reference to the extreme case in which more 
of a resource would be needed, directly and indirectly, than is being produced.) Fourth, 
without any technical progress or some deus ex machina, our economy would be doomed to 
extinction, at least in the long (or very long) run. This brings us to a discussion of the role of a 
‘backstop technology’ in the economic system under consideration, whose role is precisely 
that of a deus ex machina or saviour of the world. 
 
Despite the changes introduced in the above model, the procedure to prove the existence of a 
solution to the model of 2000 in the presence of a backstop technology can be applied also 
here. More precisely, let the processes A,B,0, l( ) be obtained from (A, B, C, l) by deleting all 
the processes using directly some natural resource (i.e., process e
i
T
A,e
i
T
B,e
i
T
C,e
i
T
l( ) is in the 
set of processes A,B,0, l( ) if and only if ei
T
C = 0 ) and let us assume that there is a scalar r* 
and there are vectors x* and p* which solve the system 
 xT B !A ! lwT( )  " dT   
 xT B !A ! lwT( )p =  dTp   
 Bp ! 1+ r *( )Ap " lwTp   
 xTBp ! xT 1+ r *( )Ap " lwTp#$ %&   
 x ! 0,p ! 0,  dTp =1 . 
Let us assume, further, that the processes corresponding to positive elements of vector x*, 
Aˆ, Bˆ,0, lˆ( ) , are exactly n and that in the absence of exhaustible resources the economy would 
converge to these processes. Then the procedure used by Kurz and Salvadori (2000) is able to 
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construct a solution also for system (1)-(11) despite the introduction of capacity contraints on 
the extraction of resources. Such a proof follows exactly the same lines and we will not 
provide it here. 
 
What we want to stress here, on the contrary, is that the introduction of capacity constraints 
on the extraction of resources may introduce a further reason in support of the view that 
whereas the prices of resources in situ are bound to change at a rate equal to the rate of 
profits, all other prices will remain constant or will at any rate not follow the path of the 
former. We do not wish to assert that this fact will in fact happen, but that it may happen. This 
is so because the owners of deposits of resources get not only royalties, but also rents. The 
sum of royalties and rents for a given deposit may be constant even if royalties are changing, 
since rents are changing in equal amounts but in the opposite direction. To see this, consider 
an economy where capacity constraints are so high that production of consumption d requires 
the operation of the backstop technology and therefore processes Aˆ, Bˆ,0, lˆ( )  are activated. As 
a consequence, vector p is determined and it may also be constant over time (it is so in the 
long run). This does not mean that production goes on in the same way year after year. Not at 
all: production changes potentially every year since the use of the resources reduces their 
availability. But the reduction of the availability of resources reduces also the rents and since 
the price of the extracted mineral is constant over time, the rent is reduced in exactly the same 
amount in which royalties are increased because of Hotelling’s Rule.   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The world to which applies the Hotelling Rule in its modern interpretation and the world to 
which applies the classical, especially Ricardian analysis are rather different. While the 
Hotelling Rule presupposes that a scarce natural resource is available in a known quantity and 
its extraction is not subject to any capacity constraints, Ricardo’s treatment of exhaustible 
deposits does not contemplate the case of the exhaustion of the resource as a whole and 
allows for capacity constraints that limit extraction per unit of time with respect to each 
deposit actually known at a given moment of time. Both types of analyses are valuable and 
improve our understanding of the properties of economic systems that make use of wasting 
assets. It is then argued in terms of a model with exhaustible resources that incorporates what 
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we think are the premisses from which Ricardo begins his reasoning, that the Hotelling Rule 
can be considered to be implied by it: the Rule concerns the resources in situ and requests 
their prices to change at a rate that is equal to the competitive rate of profits. However, these 
changes need not affect the prices of the other commodities, including the prices of the 
resources that are actually extracted. Hence, in Ricardo’s argument the Hotelling Rule may be 
said to be effective, but its effects may be limited to changing prices of the conserved amounts 
of exhaustible resources only. The owners of deposits will obtain both royalties and rents, in 
the course of time rents will fall and royalties rise, and the sum of both may remain constant. 
If this condition is met, then these price changes will not affect any other prices in the 
economic system. Ricardo’s argument may be said to implicitly correspond to this case.  
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